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A neW YeAR, A neW RUBRiC. Last year, we fretted that former Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) Administrator David Safavian’s arrest, indictment, and trial might cripple serious pro-
curement reform for the remainder of the Bush administration. This year, the administration tapped 
Paul Denett, a credible, steady, experienced acquisition professional to restore confidence in federal 
acquisition. OFPP Nominee Promises Strong Leadership, 48 GC ¶ 225. Yet, with no clear mandate 
other than a dogged devotion to competitive sourcing (more on that below), less than two years before 
the 2008 elections, and a modest staff, Denett likely cannot expect to achieve dramatic reform.
But 2006 begins with acquisition professionals and policy wonks poring over the 400+ page “Draft 
Final” Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel (AAP), a blue-ribbon commission launched in 2003 by 
Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA). See www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/
draftfinalreport.html. Comments on the report were due by January 5, 2007 (yes, the two-week com-
ment period spanned Christmas and New Year’s), and we expect to see the final report soon after. 
The AAP Report offers a thoughtful discussion of trends, a helpful executive summary, and seven 
substantive chapters: (1) Commercial Practices; (2) Improving Implementation Of Performance-Based 
Service Acquisition (PBSA) In The Federal Government; (3) Interagency Contracting; (4) Small Busi-
ness; (5) The Federal Acquisition Workforce; (6) Appropriate Role Of Contractors Supporting Govern-
ment; and (7) Federal Procurement Data. Given its timing and scope (and to the extent that we’re 
numbed by the relentless focus on ethics, compliance, and procurement scandals, here and abroad), 
the AAP Report provides us with a fresh lens through which to view the year’s emerging policy and 
practice issues.
We find this a much more aspirational, if not more optimistic, approach than, for example, the 
Project on Government Oversight’s (POGO’s) “Baker’s Dozen” of Suggested Congressional Oversight 
Priorities. www.pogo.org/p/x/2007bakersdozen.html. Not surprisingly, POGO’s agenda focuses dis-
proportionately upon issues related, directly or indirectly, to public procurement. While we consider 
the list somewhat hyperbolic and a tad shrill, many of POGO’s priorities remain instructive: (1) 
Addressing Federal Contractor Misconduct (“contracting will … be plagued with waste, fraud, and 
corruption until bad actors have been genuinely held accountable”); (2) Hidden Costs of Privatizing 
Government (“anecdotal evidence suggests that contractors are now handling functions … previously 
… considered the exclusive domain of the government, raising questions about whether the govern-
ment can adequately control its spending and fulfill its mission”); (3) Executive Branch Revolving Door 
and Conflicts-of-Interest (“rules were confusing and failed to rein in … the most egregious abuses”); 
(5) The Black Hole that is Pentagon Spending (“Congress should demand more … transparency and 
accountability”); (7) Defense Spending Priorities: Supporting the Troops or the Defense Contractors? 
(“the 109th Congress … cut spending on equipment Marines were using in Iraq – including night 
vision goggles and upgrades to light-armored vehicles – and transferred those funds to breathe life 
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support into the troubled V-22 Osprey, which cannot even be used in 
high-risk environments”); (8) Government Watchdog and Accountability 
Organizations (“more oversight … is needed to assess whether … billions 
… in government contracts are being adequately policed”); (9) Dragging 
the Government out of the Cold War (“[DoD] continues to maintain our 
deployed nuclear weapons on hair-trigger Cold War alert status”); (13) And 
of Course: Fixing the Broken Federal Contracting System (“problems … 
are the result of … procurement or acquisition ‘reforms,’ including cozy 
negotiations, inadequate competition, lack of accountability, little trans-
parency, and risky contracting vehicles that are prone to waste, fraud, 
and abuse”). 
i. A JoB WeLL Done. The Acquisition Advisory Panel did a com-
mendable job, given the unique composition of the panel, the breadth of the 
mandate, the nature of collaborative endeavors of this scale, the (from our 
perspective) inadequate resources with which it had to work, and the moun-
tain of data and anecdotal evidence available on the acquisition system’s 
current woes. (We’re biased: our colleague, Joshua Schwartz, served on the 
Panel, and two of our students served on the Panel’s professional staff.) 
The Panel’s analysis was insightful, and we applaud the Panel not only 
for recognizing the key trends in federal acquisition – the sagging acquisi-
tion workforce, the explosion in services contracting, the consolidation in 
federal contracting that favors larger firms, and the rapid rise of task- and 
delivery-order contracting – but also for aligning its recommendations with 
those trends. Ultimately, the Panel’s recommendations derive from a simple 
premise: The private sector does a better job with procurement by planning 
carefully and employing aggressive competition. The Panel identified the 
key constraints that keep the government from buying as a private firm 
would (Draft Report, at 8): special fiscal rules; urgent missions; inadequate 
staffing; social and economic objectives unrelated to achieving value for 
money; and unique accountability and oversight expectations and require-
ments. The Panel’s recommendations map out its reforms in light of those 
special constraints. With few notable exceptions, the proposed reforms were 
careful and incremental, which also means they were neither revolutionary 
nor terribly controversial. The Panel’s most aggressive recommendations 
address interagency contracting (addressed at length below). The Panel 
rightly appeared troubled by the rapid proliferation of interagency contracts, 
which all too often offer too little competition and transparency. Yet even 
here, the Panel compromised where a less compromising approach – based 
upon traditional principles of competition, transparency, and accountability 
– might prove more effective.
ii. TRAnSPARenCY, oPACiTY, AnD FeDeRAL  
 PRoCUReMenT DATA 
A. information is Power. Last year, the jury remained out on 
whether the not-so-new, privatized, Federal Procurement Data System-
Next Generation (FPDS-NG) would serve as a useful outsourcing success 
story. We sensed that it was premature for GSA to claim that the FPDS-
NG has enhanced transparency, improved efficiency in government, and 
served the contractor community. GAO had expressed “concerns regarding 
whether the new system has achieved the intended improvements in the 
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areas of timeliness and accuracy of data, as well as ease of use and access 
to data …[and] as to whether the FPDS-NG system has the flexibility to 
capture data on interagency contracting transactions.” See GAO-05-960R, 
Improvements Needed to FPDS-NG (Sept. 27, 2005), www.gao.gov/new.
items/d05960r.pdf; 47 GC ¶ 421. Now it is clear that the situation is worse 
than expected. The FPDS-NG failed to win the AAP’s hearts and minds.
[T]he report documents a long history of inaccurate data input 
by agencies. For example, the Panel’s survey of PBA contracts 
and orders found that of the sample reviewed, 42% that were 
entered in FPDS-NG as performance based, clearly were not 
(with some agencies admitting to FPDS-NG coding errors).
The Panel expressed particular frustration in attempting to quantify 
interagency contracting activity. “From the outset of the Panel’s work, we 
have been frustrated by the lack of data available to conduct a thorough 
analysis of interagency contracts and the orders placed under them.” Nor 
was this an isolated example (however significant that example might be). 
“The Panel also is concerned with the amount of incorrect data entered 
into the system by agencies….” In the end, “[a]mong other recommenda-
tions for data improvement, the Panel has made several to focus atten-
tion on the importance of agencies inputting accurate data, including 
a statutory amendment assigning Agency Heads the accountability for 
accurate input.”
Nonetheless, the Panel began with an eye-catcher: “Each year Federal 
agencies spend nearly $400 billion for a range of goods and services to 
meet their mission needs.” That’s a terrific reminder how rapidly procure-
ment spending has increased after its late-1990’s plateau. “From fiscal 
year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, government purchasing increased nearly 
75% from $219 billion to more than $380 billion.” 
Fiscal 
Year
Transactions 
(in millions)
Dollars
(in billions)
Percentage 
increase
2005 10.81 $378 10.8
2004 10.5 $346 13.51
2003 11.5 $305 22.1
2002 8.65 $250 6.5
2001 11.4 $234 7.3
2000 9.8 $218 -
See fPDs-next GeneratIon, https://www.fpds.gov (Trending Analysis 
Report for the Last 5 Years). Once again, we wonder whether this will be 
the year the spending binge ends. We continue to fret that, not only has 
government (procurement and non-procurement) spending increased, 
but the government continues to spend money far more quickly than it 
generates income. That seems unsustainable, and the early rhetoric of 
the Democratic Congress indicates some level of recognition. A dose of 
fiscal reality in 2007 could dramatically impact the federal government’s 
purchasing practices. 
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B.  Harsh Reality. For casual readers, some the Report’s statistics 
may not only surprise, but disturb. (We discuss many of these trends 
below.) In FY 2005, fully one fourth of federal contracts were awarded 
without competition. The Panel also chronicled the government’s transition 
from a supply purchaser to a service consumer: “Services now comprise a 
greater percentage of the government’s acquisition budget. Between 1990 
and 1995 the government began spending more on services than goods. 
Currently, procurement spending on services accounts for more than 60% 
of total procurement dollars. In FY 2005, DOD obligated more than $141 
billion on service contracts, a 72% increase since FY 1999.” Draft Report at 
2-3 (footnotes omitted). The Panel described the lack of transparency and 
competition in interagency contracting as a “significant concern,” noting 
that, in 2004, forty percent of all government obligations ($142 billion) 
was spent through interagency contracts. Draft Report, at 3-7; 1-38 to 1-
39 (growth in dollar GSA schedules sales). Similar observations surfaced 
during GAO’s lively forum on acquisition reform. See generally, GAO Hosts 
Forum on Acquisition Reform, 48 GC ¶ 405, GAO-07-45SP, Highlights of 
GAO Forum, Federal Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st 
Century, available at www.gao.gov:
 [A]cquisition issues are heavily represented on GAO’s list 
of government high-risk areas. … [T]he government needs to 
reexamine and evaluate its strategic and tactical approaches 
to acquisition.... Forum participants [addressed] ... three broad 
challenges … : (1) Determining who should perform the business 
of government in a constantly changing environment.... (2) 
Ensuring the federal workforce has the capacity and capability 
to manage contractor operations effectively.... [and] (3) Managing 
for results and accountability in a contractor-dependent 
environment....
iii. LeGiSLATiVe MAnDATe, ReFoRM AGenDA, oR Re-
SeARCH PRoJeCT? Now the White House is in an awkward position. 
Representative Tom Davis (R-VA) launched the Panel to fill a vacuum 
because acquisition reform was needed, no leadership emanated from the 
White House, and OFPP lacked the necessary bandwidth, in part because 
its resources were consumed by “competitive sourcing” (or outsourcing 
of government jobs). In return, Davis expected a comprehensive acquisi-
tion reform agenda for a Republican-controlled Congress. My, how things 
change! The final report will be delivered into a politically charged envi-
ronment. Congressional Democrats, eager to hold hearings, are pointing to 
the report as evidence that the Bush administration failed to responsibly 
steward $380 billion in procurement. (Might that prove precisely the kind 
of centrist message calculated to propel the Democrats to the White House 
in 2008?) Unlike Tom Davis’ Republican-controlled Government Reform 
Committee, Chairman Henry Waxman’s (D-CA) committee will feel no 
obligation to adopt any of the Panel’s recommendations. (Contrast this 
with the Section 800 Panel’s recommendations, which became the blueprint 
for Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR) acquisition 
reform initiative. See Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 800, 104 Stat. 1485, 1587 
(1990).) Instead, Chairman Waxman can pick and choose to bolster an 
agenda already outlined in his Clean Contracting Act (H.R. 6069 in the 
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109th Congress). Indeed, the Panel’s dire warnings may convince mem-
bers, such as incoming House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike 
Skelton (D-MO), to support a revised version of the Clean Contracting 
Act. If the White House endorses the Panel report, many will ask why 
the administration dawdled rather than launch its own initiatives. If the 
White House opposes the Panel’s recommendations, it plays into the hands 
of Democrats who assert that the White House studiously countenanced 
corruption in contracting. 
We’re guessing Tom Davis did not get what he expected. Since 2003, 
when Davis’ House Government Reform Committee approved the Ser-
vices Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) and the bill later became part of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
136, the world has changed. In 2003, fighting in Iraq had just begun and 
most believed that it would soon end. Representative Davis expected the 
AAP to provide an acquisition reform agenda for the House Government 
Reform Committee, which he would chair until 2009. The Panel’s report, 
originally expected no later than mid-2005, suffered from start-up impedi-
ments and a morphing mandate. (Davis’s vision for the panel included 
neither small business nor acquisition workforce issues.) In retrospect, 
SARA’s modest reforms, largely meant to fine-tune the “commercial item 
revolution” of the 1990s, seem almost quaint. The tidal wave of contract-
ing dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the scandals in lobbying and federal 
procurement, and a stream of critical reports from inspectors general 
(IG’s) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), deflated any 
optimism surrounding federal contracting. Today, the acquisition system 
desperately needs reform. 
iV. THe FeDeRAL ACQUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe (iS Fine; 
GLoBAL WARMinG iS A MYTH; AnD….) The Report performed a 
valuable public service by discussing the acquisition workforce and, in 
so doing, raising the profile of this critical issue. Although this issue fell 
outside of its legislative mandate, the Panel persuasively argued that 
acquisition workforce problems permeate most, if not all, of the issues 
before the Panel. See Draft Report, at pp. 5-1 to 5-3. That’s spot-on!
 There … are fewer acquisition professionals in the government 
to award and administer contracts as the government’s 
contracting workforce has reduced in size over the last decade. 
The federal acquisition workforce has declined by nearly 50 
percent since personnel reductions in the mid-1990s. Despite 
recent efforts to hire acquisition personnel, there is an acute 
shortage of federal procurement professionals with between 
five and 15 years of experience. This shortage will become more 
pronounced in the near term because roughly half of the current 
workforce is eligible to retire in the next four years.
Draft Report at 3. The Panel did more than any group to date in at-
tempting to catalog the scope of the problem. The Panel engaged a contrac-
tor, Beacon Associates, to collect and analyze the voluminous available 
data. We agree with the Panel that: (1) agencies have failed to perform 
systematic human capital planning to assess their acquisition workforce, 
either in the present or with an eye towards the future; (2) despite the 
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myriad methods in which the acquisition workforce has been defined and 
counted over time and among agencies, no one appears to be attempting 
to quantify contractor personnel that currently play an important role in 
assisting, supporting, and, yes, augmenting the acquisition workforce; 
and (3) “While the private sector invests substantially in a corps of highly 
sophisticated, credentialed and trained business managers to accomplish 
sourcing, procurement and management of functions, the government does 
not make comparable investments.” Consider this:
Steven L. Schooner, Keeping Up With Procurement, 38 Gov. exeC. 74 
(July 1, 2006) (“[I]t should be obvious that the federal government lacks 
a sufficient acquisition workforce to obtain the best value for the money 
it spends on goods and services.... In the years it will take to reach agree-
ment on the optimal head count, agencies could be replenishing acquisition 
offices.”), www.govexec.com/features/0706-01/0706-01advp.htm. In the 
end, however, the Panel blinked and surrendered to the threshold issues 
of process. The Panel concluded that it lacked sufficient credible informa-
tion on the size, composition, or strength of the acquisition workforce to 
make meaningful recommendations as to the target size of the acquisi-
tion workforce. Accordingly, the Report’s findings and recommendations 
primarily address planning and data-gathering. See Draft Report at pp. 
5-14 to 5-57. 
Meanwhile, the drums beat out a host of simple messages that our 
political leadership have ignored for more than fifteen years: The macro 
(government-wide) and micro (acquisition workforce) effects of the 1990’s 
downsizing frenzy left the federal government woefully unprepared to 
identify, recruit, manage, and incentivize the (hypothetically revolution-
ized) acquisition workforce envisioned by the 1990’s acquisition reforms. 
At the time, no empirical evidence supported the reductions, yet the 
sustained reductions and subsequent failure to replenish the workforce 
created a generational void and devastated procurement personnel mo-
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rale. Meanwhile, despite clear mandates requiring agencies to contract 
out government functions (and explosive growth in the reliance upon 
service contracts), no emphasis was placed upon retaining or obtaining 
skilled professionals to plan for, compete, award, or manage sophisti-
cated long-term service contracts. Accordingly, the failure to respond to 
a dramatic increase in procurement activity lead to a triage-type focus 
on buying, which severely limited the resources available for contract 
administration, management, and oversight. All of which could serve as 
an explanation for the meteoric rise in, and reliance upon, interagency 
contracting. See, also, the Professional Services Council (PSC) and Grant 
Thornton’s Troubling Trends survey, Acquisition Workforce Top Concern 
for Federal Managers, Survey Says, 48 GC ¶ 398, www.pscouncil.org/
pdfs/2006PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf; MSPB Releases Analysis 
of Contracting Officer Representatives Survey, 48 GC ¶ 178; DoD Not 
Publishing List of Critical Acquisition Workforce, DOD IG Says, 48 GC 
¶ 321 (internal records for acquisition personnel were inconsistent and 
inaccurate); Over Half of Acquisition Workforce Eligible to Retire By 2015, 
FAI Report Says, 48 GC ¶ 283; Advisory Panel Calls for Comprehensive 
Database On Acquisition Workforce, 48 GC ¶ 244; IG Criticizes DOD Count 
of Acquisition Workforce, 48 GC ¶ 149; Katrina and Rita Response: Poor 
Planning, Lack of Communication and Insufficient Staffing Resulted in 
Poor Acquisition Practices, 48 GC ¶ 138; OMB Announces New Certifica-
tion Program for Acquisition Personnel, 48 GC ¶ 44.
V. inTeRAGenCY ConTRACTinG: THe eLePHAnT in THe  
 RooM
A. Shine A Light. We were pleased that the Panel devoted so much 
attention to interagency contracting. The Panel’s recommendations follow 
sustained calls for reform. See, e.g., Draft Report, at pp.3-1 to 3-7 (summary 
of reports, findings and recommendations on interagency contracting); 
Michael C. Wong, Current Problems with Multiple Award Indefinite De-
livery/Indefinite Contracts: A Primer, armY LaWYer, Sept. 2006 (available 
at www.jagcnet.army.mil/TJAGLCS or www.pubklaw.com/papers.html); 
GAO Finds DHS Interagency Contracting Controls Lacking, 48 GC ¶ 339, 
GAO-06-996, Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and 
Oversight Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address 
Risks, www.gao.gov/new.items/d06996.pdf. As GAO explained:
 [Although t]his contracting method is often chosen because 
it requires less planning than establishing a new contract, 
… not all interagency contracts provide good value when 
considering timeliness and cost. …. [I]n all four cases for which 
an analysis of alternatives was required, it was not conducted. 
DHS officials said benefits of speed and convenience—not 
total value including cost—have often driven decisions to 
choose these types of contracts…. [Moreover,] DHS does not 
systematically monitor its total spending on interagency 
contacts and does not assess the outcomes of its use of this 
contracting method.
That sounds familiar. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Scott Higham, 
Interior, Pentagon Faulted In Audits: Effort to Speed Defense Contracts 
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Wasted Millions, Wash. Post A1, (December 25, 2006). “More than half 
of the contracts examined were awarded without competition or without 
checks to determine that the prices were reasonable, according to the 
audits by the inspectors general for Defense (DOD) and Interior (DOI). 
Ninety-two percent of the work reviewed was awarded without verifying 
that the contractors’ cost estimates were accurate; 96 percent was inad-
equately monitored.” See also, Problems Remain with DoD Purchases Made 
Through GSA, 48 GC ¶ 406 (nearly all of the purchases reviewed were 
“either hastily planned or improperly executed or funded” and most of the 
purchases sampled lacked acquisition planning, did not have adequate 
interagency agreements with GSA, and did not develop adequate quality 
assurance plans), D-2007-007, FY 2005 DOD Purchases Made Through 
the General Services Administration, www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/
FY07/07-007.pdf; Lack of Controls, Confusing Guidance Plague Marine 
Corps Intergovernmental Purchases, DOD IG Says, 48 GC ¶ 293. See also, 
GAO-05-456, Interagency Contracting: Franchise Funds Provide Conve-
nience, But Value to DOD Is Not Demonstrated (July 29, 2005); GAO-05-
201, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders 
to Support Military Operations (Apr. 29, 2005); GAO-05-350T, GAO’s 2005 
High-Risk Update, GAO Rep. No. (Feb. 17, 2005); GAO-05-207, GAO High-
Risk Series: An Update, (Jan. 1, 2005) (adding interagency contracting to 
“high-risk” list); GAO No. NSIAD-96-10, Interagency Contracting: Controls 
Over Economy Act Orders Being Strengthened (Oct. 20, 1995); Ralph C. 
Nash, Federal Supply Schedule: Agencies Can Use It When They Want, 20 
N&CR ¶ 55 (November 2006).
The Panel’s recommendations, however, imply that taxpayers do not 
deserve (or are not entitled to) a fully transparent procurement system. 
Sure, we routinely make economic decisions that stop short of full trans-
parency. Procurements for more than a relatively low amount, $25,000, 
require a certain amount of publicity, competition, and post-award pub-
lic notice, and are subject to protest, while more stringent demands are 
imposed at the $100,000 level. See generally Draft Report, at pp.1-29 to 
1-31. Since the mid-1990’s, interagency contracting constituted a radical 
departure. These flexible vehicles have shielded billions of dollars in or-
ders from basic requirements of transparency and competition (while, all 
too often avoiding common sense expectations for pre-award requirement 
descriptions and post-award management and surveillance). Thus, at one 
level, the Panel’s most radical decision was to countenance that suboptimal 
procurement system by tolerating the existing interagency contracting 
regime. See Draft Report, at pp. 3-38 to 3-44.
B. Fixing the Problem? The Report focused on the problems internal 
to interagency contracting that ultimately reflect a breakdown in the com-
petitive process. The storyline is familiar: There is insufficient definition of 
requirements at the time interagency contracts are first let. (The phrase 
“open-ended statement of work” springs to mind.) Once orders are to be 
issued against those standing contracts, there is far too little competition 
for those orders. (That’s consistent with the perception that contractors 
treat these vehicles as “hunting licenses.”) The Panel found only spotty 
publication of proposed interagency purchases or awards, that there is 
seldom robust competition for orders, and accountability and transparency 
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fail because there are no debriefings (nor, generally, protests) of task- or 
delivery-order awards under the standing agreements. See Draft Report, 
at 9. 
Debriefing and Protest Rights for Orders over $5 Million: We applaud 
the Panel for recommending that disappointed offerors for orders over 
$5 million be entitled to at least some debriefing and protest rights. Con-
versely, the threshold seems arbitrary. (It also ignores the fact that GAO 
already entertains protests on all levels of GSA Multiple Award Schedule 
(MAS) orders.) The $5 million figure seems to have been chosen because 
it marks the median value of orders. See Draft Report, at pp. 1-76 to 1-77. 
We wonder whether: (a) there is any evidence that there is less likelihood 
of government error or corruption in orders below $5 million and thus 
less need for transparency, or (b) whether purchasing officials act less ir-
rationally on smaller orders (which would suggest less need for oversight 
and accountability). With regard to debriefings, FAR Subpart 16.5 and 
the GAO already afford contracting officers broad discretion in shaping 
debriefings (such that, at a minimum, only a written description of the 
basis of award needs to be given). This minimal requirement would not 
cripple the interagency procurement system. Rather, we assume that the 
Panel engaged in a cost-benefit analysis (and, while we might disagree, 
some progress is better than none). The recommendation on protests also 
is laudable (if not courageous, given the public disdain for protests), yet 
the compromise is difficult to reconcile. Around the globe, procurement 
officials recognize that protests (an extremely efficient form of third-party 
oversight) ensure transparency, competition, and accountability. Immuniz-
ing any aspect of a procurement system from protest is dangerous, because 
it shelters arbitrary or corrupt action from review.
Expanding the Defense Department’s 803 Mandates Government-wide. 
The Panel recommended government-wide applicability of two rules 
previously made applicable to DoD pursuant to Section 803 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. 107-107), 
per DFARS 216.505-70. First, all eligible contractors would be entitled 
to notice of impending orders on a standing interagency contract. Draft 
Report, at pp. 1-34 to 37 (“fair opportunity” requirements for order com-
petition discussed). Of course, this limited notice will not reach the public 
or potential vendors that do not hold standing contracts. The Panel also 
would require that agencies receive at least three offers for orders under 
interagency contracts. Practical experience, however, cautions that this 
requirement (charade?) is easily overcome by soliciting empty offers from 
vendors that are certain to lose.
Going Further? We were disappointed that the Panel failed to mandate 
pre-award notice when orders are awarded on a sole-source basis. It also 
appeared overly cautious in its recommendations regarding structured 
competitions. Only for orders over $5 million where a statement of work is 
already required would the Panel require (1) a clear statement of require-
ments, (2) disclosure of significant evaluation factors and subfactors, and 
their relative importance, (3) a reasonable response time for those sub-
mitting proposals, and (4) documentation of the source selection decision 
(including the trade-off of price and quality). Finally, the Report’s argument 
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for requiring post-award notice – to provide “transparency and the positive 
pressures that transparency imparts” (Draft Report, at 9) – seems to prove 
the need for pre-award notice. Unless competitors know of a prospective 
opportunity, they will have little incentive to compete for (or scrutinize) 
the business opportunity. More broadly, the Panel’s recommendation for 
post-award notice was already overtaken by the law with the Federal Fund-
ing Accountability and Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 109-329 (September 
26, 2006), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060926.html, 
which requires that all “federal awards” (including task and delivery or-
ders) be published on the web by January 1, 2008.
We would have preferred the Panel to demand full transparency, 
competition and accountability for task-order contracting. Ironically, 
that might prove more simple and less expensive and disruptive than the 
Panel’s complicated compromises. We recommend:
•	 Publicizing All Prospective Purchases Over $25,000 (or, in the 
alternative, $100,000): Every business opportunity over $25,000 
(or, again, in the alternative, $100,000) intended to be awarded 
through interagency orders should be publicized on FedBizOpps, 
www.fedbizopps.gov. Many such opportunities are already publi-
cized through GSA’s “e-Buy” system, see www.gsaadvantage.gov. 
Unfortunately, the “e-Buy” system is closed to prospective con-
tractors without a good or service on the appropriate GSA sched-
ule, just as it is closed to journalists, taxpayers, and members 
of Congress. See, e.g., www.ebuy.gsa.gov; Draft Report, at p.1-43 
(“the system is set up so that all vendors within the selected 
product/service categories or SINs can view the RFQ ... and sub-
mit quotations”). 
•	 Structuring All Competitions To Optimize Best Value: The goals 
that the Panel set for orders over $5 million – a sound statement 
of requirements, with clear evaluation criteria, reasonable time 
for response, and a documented award – should logically be ap-
plied to all orders, of whatever size. DoD already applies many 
of these requirements to all interagency services orders over 
$100,000, see, e.g., DFARS 216.505-70. The alternative seems 
untenable: Have we really reached the point where multi-million 
dollar orders with open-ended statements of work can be award-
ed without even the most fundamental predicates? 
•	 Affording Debriefings for All Awards: The core purpose of de-
briefings is to assure disappointed offerors that they should not 
abandon the federal marketplace; that they have not lost for ir-
rational or corrupt reasons. That purpose is just as important in 
small procurements (e.g., under $5 million) as in large ones.
•	 Allowing Protests of All Orders: While making orders over $5 
million subject to protest was laudable, the threshold is simply 
too high.
This type of reform will not come from the agencies, the FAR Council, 
OFPP, or the administration. Now it’s up to Congress, and so the reform 
agendas of key Democratic leaders will prove critically important.
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C. interagency Contracting: Competition, Consolidation, 
Combustion. One key problem with managing, let alone reforming, inter-
agency contracting is their astronomical growth. In the weeks before the 
Panel’s draft report, OFPP acknowledged that several hundred interagency 
contracts have grown up across the government, largely unchecked. See 
Matthew Weigelt, Interagency Contracts Need Parameters, Officials Say, 
feDeraL ComP. Week, Dec. 6, 2006, www.fcw.com/article97023-12-06-06-
Web). Although he acknowledged concerns with proliferating interagency 
contracts, OFPP’s Denett argued gamely that the multiple contracts en-
hance competition among contracting vehicles, see Daniel Pulliam, OMB 
Looks to Boost Use of Interagency Contracts, Gov. exeC. (Dec. 5, 2006) www.
govexec.com/dailyfed/1206/120506p1.htm. Those who oppose consolida-
tion ignore the efficiencies of uniformity. Should the government really 
manage hundreds of interagency contracts? GSA Administrator Lurita 
Doan argued that proliferating contracts should be consolidated at GSA. 
See, e.g., Rob Thormeyer, Doan Takes GSA Back to Basics, Wash. teCh. 
Oct. 16, 2006, www.washingtontechnology.com/news/21_20/news/29524-
1.html. This has a certain logical appeal, even though it follows a sharp 
drop in GSA revenues and must be contemplated in light of GSA’s strong 
self-interest (specifically, its reliance upon fees to survive and thrive). 
GSA’s struggle stems, in large part, from a serious decline in DoD usage, 
prompted by a series of sharply critical reports about abuses in interagency 
contracting. See, e.g., DOD IG, D-2007-007 FY 2005 DoD Purchases Made 
Through the General Services Administration, (Oct. 30, 2006), www.dodig.
mil/Audit/reports/FY07/07-007.pdf; DOD IG, D-2007-023, Acquisition: 
FY2005 DoD Purchases Made Through the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (Nov. 13, 2006) (available at www.dodig.osd.mil/
Audit/reports/FY07/07-023.pdf (of 111 DOD orders reviewed through 
the NASA Scientific and Engineering Workstation Procurement (SEWP) 
contracts, 98 were “either improperly executed, improperly funded, or 
both”); Draft Report, at pp.1-60 to 1-61 (recounting review “by GAO and 
the DoD IG over several years [which] have repeatedly called into ques-
tion the competitiveness of the ordering process under task and delivery 
order contracts”). 
GSA responded that DoD’s standards for interagency contracting were 
“evolving” in a proliferating set of DoD guidance. Id. at iii & 6. To solve 
this problem – to stabilize the standards for interagency contracting – in 
December 2006, DoD and GSA entered into a memorandum of understand-
ing, establishing standards for GSA performance in handling interagency 
orders for the Defense Departments. See Memorandum of Agreement Be-
tween General Services Administration and Department of Defense (Dec. 
4, 2006) available at www.gcn.com/newspics/Dod-GSA_MOU_12.06.06.
pdf. Notably, this was precisely the solution urged by Representative 
Waxman’s bill, H.R. 6069: a “written agreement between the requesting 
agency and the servicing agency assigning responsibility for the adminis-
tration and management of the contract.” Id. § 303. While the DoD–GSA 
agreement has been roundly criticized as overly restrictive, the existence 
of the agreement suggests the way forward for interagency contracting. 
The December 2006 DoD–GSA agreement highlights one key point on 
which interagency contracts will compete: the most successful interagency 
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vehicles will accommodate customer agencies’ unique requirements, and, 
given increasing outside scrutiny, those requirements will likely entail ever 
broader regulatory burdens. The race among scores of interagency vehicles, 
in other words, may well be a race to the top (reversing the decade-long 
race to the bottom) – a competition in which the winner will be the “most 
righteous” interagency vehicle, i.e., the interagency contracting vehicle 
that best ensures that customer agencies can comply with a myriad of 
procurement rules and fiscal laws. 
If this happens, it will turn traditional concerns about interagency con-
tracting on their head. GAO placed interagency contracts on its “high-risk” 
list in 2005 precisely because of the “downward” forces inherent in inter-
agency contracting: the incentives for sponsoring agencies to cut corners 
to attract orders from customer agencies. GAO’s concern – that customer 
agencies and centralized purchasing agencies might collude to reduce 
their burdens by avoiding competition, transparency, and accountability 
– may now be reversed. With pressure from Congress, from IG’s, and from 
other outside critics, centralized purchasing agencies (such as GSA) and 
their customer agencies (such as DoD) may be forced onto a higher plane 
– and, thus, regulatory compliance ultimately may lend GSA and other 
centralized purchasing agencies a competitive advantage in the fight for 
interagency orders. If the procurement market continues to evolve in this 
direction, ultimately those centralized purchasing agencies that are best 
able to accommodate regulatory compliance – likely those agencies with the 
resources and experience to accommodate a rapidly escalating set of com-
pliance demands – will be the most likely to prevail. That leads to the next 
logical question: whether the ad hoc (and sometimes bitter) competition 
between interagency vehicles will, in time, devolve into a more structured 
process for selecting centralized purchasing agencies, perhaps under the 
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) ongoing “Line of Business” 
initiative, with specific agencies providing services to other agencies as 
“centers of excellence.” See www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/egov/c-6-lob.html, 
discussing consolidating “lines of business” (such as financial, human 
resources, grants, health, and case management systems) and guidance 
at www.fsio.gov/fsio/download/fmlob/mpgv1/2.2_-_Competition_Frame-
work.doc. OMB’s guidance suggests that these centers of excellence will 
compete, in limited fashion, with incumbent agency capabilities.
Vi. oUTSoURCinG AnD THe APPRoPRiATe RoLe oF Con-
TRACToRS SUPPoRTinG THe GoVeRnMenT. For the last couple 
of years, we’ve suggested that, despite the relentless attention focused upon 
competitive sourcing (the kind, gentile moniker for outsourcing or privati-
zation), it seemed that the regime experienced little meaningful evolution. 
But that has not deterred the White House from continuing to tout that: 
“competitions completed in FY 2005 are expected to generate net savings 
or cost avoidances totaling $3.1 billion over the next 5-10 years[.]” OMB 
Issues Annual Report on Competitive Sourcing, 48 GC ¶ 158, www.white-
house.gov/omb/procurement/comp_src/cs_annual_report_fy2005_results.
pdf. We’re stumped as to whether that represents an increase, a decrease, 
or a skillful obfuscation when compared to last year’s “achievement” of 
annual gross savings of approximately $500 million. But hope spring 
eternal, such that when the Government “fully implement[s] competitive 
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sourcing, it will save at least $6 billion each year[.]” PMC Reports $50 
Billion Annual Savings Through Improved Performance, 48 GC ¶ 381, 
PresIDent’s manaGement CounCIL, GIvInG the amerICan PeoPLe more for 
theIr moneY, www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/06_Results_Report.
pdf. Don’t spend your $6 billion just yet. The referenced Attachment F to 
the report indicates that, for all agencies combined, the projected annual 
savings from completed competitions is $897 million, and the potential 
annual savings from future competitions is $4.16 billion (and, no, we don’t 
see how that becomes “at least $6 billion each year”). See also footnote 2: 
“For those agencies that have not completed any competitions involving a 
most efficient organization [MEO], the government-wide estimated savings 
average (i.e., $22,000 per FTE) was used. Future savings may vary….” 
(Emphasis added.) In any event, the outsourcing debate continues. GSA 
Proposes Privatizing Pre-Award Audits; House Democrats Object, 48 GC ¶ 
426 (including discussion of GSA Administrator Lurita Doan’s reference to 
GSA Inspector General (IG) and his staff as “terrorists”); GAO Questions 
Planning for IRS Private Debt Collection Program, 48 GC ¶ 387; Plan for 
Outsourcing Tax Collection Draws Opposition From Advocacy Panel, 48 
GC ¶ 302; House Approves Amendment to Upgrade Employee Rights to 
Protest A-76 Competitions, 48 GC ¶ 233; Private Sector Airport Screener 
Contracts Lack Cost Efficiencies, 48 GC ¶ 176; DOD Can Improve Oversight 
and Evaluation Methods Related to Privatized Housing, 48 GC ¶ 167.
Contractor Ethics: On a related note, the Acquisition Advisory Panel 
steered delicately around the issue of contractors’ ethical obligations as 
they assume ever more central roles in government. See Draft Report, 
Ch. 6. We found this surprising given the extent to which scandals have 
dominated the procurement policy discussion to an extent not seen since 
the 1980’s. See, e.g., Boeing Settles “Druyun Affair”: Tax Implications 
Concern Top Senators, 48 GC ¶ 234. Despite the Democrats’ stunningly 
successful campaign claims that Washington is immersed in a “culture of 
corruption,” and the Democrats’ clear legislative agenda of ethics reform, 
the Panel did not call for new legislation to govern contractors’ ethics 
in government. (Ironically, a statute nearly two decades old, 41 U.S.C. § 
405b, already authorizes regulations to curb conflicts of interest in those 
who closely advise the government.) Instead, the Panel recommended 
that OFPP more clearly define the dividing line between contractors and 
“inherently governmental” functions in government. Draft Report, at pp. 
6-29 to 6-30. Instead of statutory or regulatory constraints on contractors’ 
potential conflicts of interest, the Panel called for resolving the problem 
contractually, through clauses – and not necessarily prohibitive clauses, 
but rather clauses that would set out “general ethical guidelines and prin-
ciples,” perhaps by “requiring appropriate disclosures.” Draft Report, at 
25. The Panel passed this political “hot potato” back to the FAR Council. 
See Draft Report, at pp. 6-31 to 6-35. But the problem won’t go away. 
 [W]e have gone so far in allowing the Federal Government 
to lose competence that it is understandable that many … seem 
to have concluded that it is impossible to create competent 
Government agencies staffed with competent civil servants. 
That seems to be the hidden premise of the Acquisition Advisory 
Panel and may well be the view of Congress and the Executive 
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Branch. If that is so, it would be helpful for our politicians to 
openly admit that this is their view and stop pretending that it 
is good policy to contract out segments of a critical program or 
contracting office.
Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Mixed Workforce Questions, 20 N&CR 
¶ 54, A Mixed Workforce: Questioning the Result, 20 N&CR ¶ 45; see also 
SARA Panel Wary of Expanding Ethics Rules for Blended Workforce, 48 GC 
¶ 186.
Personal Services: At the same time, however, the Panel recommended 
that the government drop its bar against “personal services” contracting 
(under which a contractor employee reports to a government manager). 
See Draft Report, at pp. 6-5 to 6-13 (history of personal services bar); 6-30 
to 6-31; SARA Panel Seeks to Ease Ban on Personal Services Contracts, 48 
GC ¶ 282. If this last recommendation is adopted, and contractor employees 
can take shelter under claims of federal direction, the Panel’s laissez-faire 
approach to regulating contractor ethics may embolden rogue contractors 
who, already feeling few real legal constraints, will point to their federal 
“managers” to argue that they enjoy the government’s unction. Of course, 
that’s only if the train hasn’t already left the station.
Vii. CoMMeRCiAL ConTRACTinG
 “If there is any lesson that needs to be taught to companies 
considering dealing with the Government, it is that Government 
procurement is nothing like commercial contracting.” Ralph C. 
Nash, Dateline, 21 N&CR (January 2007). 
A. Commercial Services Contracting. Given its original mandate, 
the Panel toiled mightily to bring order to commercial service contracting. 
As noted above, the growth in service contracting has been accompanied 
by inadequate resources to properly manage the services and persistent 
woes that derive from the government’s sustained push to implement per-
formance based service contracting before the Government understood the 
initiative or how to implement it. See, also, DoD Management of Services 
Acquisition Falls Short, GAO Says, 48 GC ¶ 405; GAO-07-20, Defense 
Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition 
Outcomes, www.gao.gov/new.items/d0720.pdf; HASC Subcommittee Ques-
tions Army and Air Force on Services Contracting, 48 GC ¶ 140.
We expect the Panel’s service contracting recommendations to prove 
controversial. Yes, the Panel endorsed the use of commercial practices in 
federal contracting. But, after closely reviewing the history of commer-
cial-item contracting, see Draft Report, at p.1-11, the Panel recommended 
that streamlined commercial-item contracting be limited to “services ... 
offered and sold in the commercial marketplace.” That’s more restrictive 
than the current regulatory definition, which includes as a “commercial 
item” any service “of a type” of those sold commonly in the commercial 
marketplace. FAR 2.101; see, e.g., Draft Report, at 1-19; Information Ven-
tures, Inc., Comp. Gen. No. B-294,267, 2004 CPD ¶ 205, n.4 (noting need for 
market research to qualify services as “commercial”); SHABA Contracting, 
Comp. Gen. B-287,430, 2001 CPD ¶ 105. We agree. Limiting commercial-
9-14
© 2007 Thomson/West
NOTES
item contracting through streamlined procedures to services that are, 
in fact, broadly sold in the commercial marketplace should ensure that 
the government will receive fair prices and good quality. Draft Report at 
1-67 to 1-68; cf. World Trade Organization, Revision of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement as at 8 December 2006, www.ustr.gov/assets/
WTO/asset_upload_file771_10226.pdf (revised Government Procurement 
Agreement uses “of a type” definition for both goods and services). For 
similar reasons, the Panel recommended that time & materials (T&M) 
contracts be used to purchase such services only on a limited basis, and 
only when the government has fully planned the proposed work, to ensure 
adequate oversight. Although the Panel’s recommendations triggered 
protests from industry, it is not clear how revolutionary the Panel’s recom-
mendations were. The relevant statute, 41 U.S.C. § 403, already defines 
“commercial item” services more narrowly, as services “offered and sold 
competitively, in substantial quantities, in the commercial marketplace 
based on established catalog or market prices for specific tasks performed 
or specific outcomes to be achieved and under standard commercial terms 
and conditions,” see Draft Report, at p. 1-7. Similarly, FAR 16.601 already 
cautions against overusing T&M contracting, see id. at p.1-23; see also 71 
Fed. Reg. 74667, 74676-77 (Dec. 12, 2006); FAR Councils Publish Final 
Rule For Payments Under T&M and LH Contracts, 48 GC ¶ 431. Perhaps 
that’s just the point: we don’t really need new rules; we just need to reform 
(or conform) our practices. 
We also were intrigued to see how the discussion of commercial services 
appears to have reinvigorated policy analysis of the Truth in Negotiations 
Act. See, generally, Narrow TINA’s Commercial-Item Exception, DOD IG 
Says, 48 GC ¶ 370 (IG expressing concern that “contracting officials relied 
upon the commercial item exception … to justify dispensing with cost or 
pricing data and other protections without achieving the benefits of buying 
truly commercial products”), DoD IG Report No. D-2006-115. This begs 
the question as to whether TINA has fulfilled its intended purpose and 
whether history might provide us with a more effective and/or fair vehicle 
for achieving a similar outcome. William E. Kovacic & Steven L. Schooner, 
A Modest Proposal to Enhance Civil/Military Integration: Rethinking the 
Renegotiation Regime as a Regulatory Mechanism to Decriminalize Cost, 
Pricing, and Profit Policy, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869982; 
see also, Air Force Commercial Acquisition Practices May Lead to High 
Costs, GAO Says, 48 GC ¶ 351, GAO-06-995, DOD Contracting: Efforts 
Needed to Address Air Force Commercial Acquisition Risk, www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06995.pd, discussing the risks without the benefits:
 OSD expected that the increased use of commercial acquisition 
would provide DOD with greater access to commercial markets 
… with increased competition, better prices, and new market 
entrants and/or technologies.... [For] at least one of the expected 
benefits, attracting new market entrants, the expected benefit 
has not materialized.... [I]mproperly classifying an acquisition 
as a commercial acquisition leaves the Air Force vulnerable 
to accepting prices that may not be the best value for the 
department.... The Air Force’s use of commercial acquisition 
has also been accompanied by an increased amount of dollars 
being awarded sole-source… [and GAO found increasing sole-
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source spending on Air Force commercial contracts over the last 
6 years].
B. improving implementation of Performance-Based Service 
Acquisition (PBSA) in The Federal Government. Compared to its 
effort on interagency contracting, the Panel’s PBSA’s treatment seems 
like an afterthought. As politely as possible, the Panel conceded that 
performance-based acquisition has failed to catch fire. As was typically 
found when discussing the FPDS, data on performance-based acquisition 
appeared “insufficient” and “perhaps misleading” regarding the success 
of performance-based acquisition. See Draft Report, Ch. 7 (highlight-
ing serious problems in federal procurement data gathering). Yet, hope 
springs eternal. Like the stubborn parent convinced that his or her child 
can succeed if only given a chance – and armed with faith (rather than 
data) to support that conviction – the Panel called for broader use of 
performance-based acquisition. See Draft Report, at 15 (“Ultimately, the 
Panel determined that in view of a lack of data supporting either that the 
technique is unworkable in the federal government sector or that PBA’s 
[performance-based acquisition’s] costs outweigh its benefits, the Panel’s 
statutory mandate was clear: improve the effectiveness and appropriate 
use of PBA.”). But that ignored the obvious inference logically drawn from 
performance-based acquisition’s sorry history to date. Given the current 
acquisition workforce’s experience, training, and skills, and the demands 
placed upon the workforce, performance-based acquisition simply does not, 
and cannot be expected to, work. Thus, we are flummoxed by the Panel’s 
presumption that, absent hard data to the contrary, performance-based 
acquisition simply must work. We admire the Panel’s faith (even if we do 
not, nay, cannot, share it). But we think Ralph Nash said it best:
 we have encountered scores … of dedicated acquisition 
personnel who have attempted to follow the current guidance in 
acquiring these types of services. We can report their reaction in 
one word – frustration. A recommendation that the Government 
… press on with the 15-year effort to impose performance-based 
contracting on all varieties of services must be based on the 
proposition that all of these folks are incompetent, untrained, 
or both. We don’t believe this is so. … [T]he fundamental policy 
that is flawed. Thus, the first step in addressing improvements 
to performance-based contracting should be to define the many 
types of routine services for which it is appropriate. The second 
step should be to recommend a sound technique for those services 
for which it is inappropriate.
Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Performance-Based Contracting, 20 N&CR ¶ 
53 (November 2006); see also,Vernon J. Edwards, The Acquisition Advisory 
Panel And Performance-Based Contracting: A Wasted Year, 20 N&CR ¶ 32 
(July 2006) (“In the more than 15 years since [OFPP] issued its policy mak-
ing performance-based contracting the preferred way to buy services, the 
policy has not caught on. Working-level resistance to performance-based 
contracting has withstood pilot programs, best practices guides, samples, 
templates, a variety of handbooks, new regulations, new statutes, annual 
goals, countless conferences and seminars, unsubstantiated claims of cost 
savings and quality improvements, and all manner of hype.”).
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Viii. SMALL BUSineSS, SoCiAL AnD eConoMiC PoLi-
CieS, AnD WeALTH DiSTRiBUTion. The Panel’s recommendations 
regarding small-business contracting appear modest. See Draft Report, 
Ch. 4. (Recall that these issues were an (arguably unwelcome) eleventh 
hour compromise addition to its mandate.) Given the broad sweep of its 
investigation, however, we remain slightly disappointed that the Panel 
steered so carefully around the “third rail” in public procurement. The 
Panel scrupulously avoided addressing whether our omnipresent battery 
of social and economic preferences serve our procurement system well or, 
as most experts around the globe conclude, do extreme violence to our 
procurement regime’s ability to provide value for money, optimize com-
petitive outcomes, ensure customer satisfaction, maximize transparency, 
or enhance administrative efficiency. To the extent that this issue is being 
played out on a global scale, particularly among the European Union (EU) 
states, we sense that a valuable window of opportunity has been squan-
dered. Yes, we understand (and may even sympathize with) the Panel’s 
implicit tactical decision to conserve its political capital for its assault on 
interagency contracting. (But that doesn’t mean we aren’t disappointed.) 
And, yes, the Panel acknowledged problems with small business initiatives, 
including confusion over the priority to be given socioeconomic programs 
and failures in “cascading” procurements (which “pour over” contracting 
opportunities to large businesses only if those opportunities are not seized 
by small and disadvantaged contractors). In the end, however, the Panel 
recommended only incremental improvements and left the difficult issues 
for the next major cycle of reforms. Draft Report, at pp. 22 to 23; 4-18 to 
4-24; 4-33 to 4-41. 
Thus, it’s particularly amusing to look back on the most disruptive 
social policy of 2006: ill-conceived domestic preferences, here in the form of 
the Berry Amendment’s coverage of specialty metals. The domestic source 
requirements related to specialty metals offered a textbook example of 
how social policies can restrict competition and inject inefficiency into the 
procurement process by forcing participants to focus on matters unrelated 
to value for money. See, generally, David M. Nadler, Harvey G. Sherzer & 
Michael C. Mateer, New Department of Defense Berry Amendment Guid-
ance—Some Answers and More Questions, 48 GC ¶ 435; John W. Chierichella 
& David S. Gallacher, Berry Amendment ‘Reform’—The Sound And the Fury, 
48 GC ¶ 370 (“Berry Amendment is a relic of a former age, ill-suited to the 
realities of our global marketplace and current procurement demands”); 
John W. Chierichella & David S. Gallacher, Specialty Metals and the Berry 
Amendment—Frankenstein’s Monster and Bad Domestic Policy, 46 GC 
¶ 168; DOD Requests Berry Amendment Changes, 48 GC ¶ 143; DCMA Issues 
New Guidance on Berry Amendment Oversights, 48 GC ¶ 94. See also, John 
J. Pavlick & Rebecca E. Pearson, New DoD Guidance on the Berry Amend-
ment: Still Berry After All These Years, ProCurement LaWYer (forthcoming 
2007) (Recent statutory changes [to “one of the most vexing of the domestic 
preference statutes affecting government contracts”] have tantalized … 
with the possibility of meaningful reforms. … [M]any held out hope that 
implementing regulations and guidance would aggressively exploit open-
ings in the legislative language to provide the sought-after relief. However, 
guidance … once again adopts a wait and see attitude.”)
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But this single domestic preference-based disruption is by no means 
the sole example of how social policy impedes efficient procurement out-
comes. A favorite bastardization of the procurement regime remains the 
ill-suited and, apparently, unconsummated, marriage of Alaska Native 
Firms to the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) program. See, e.g., GAO 
Criticizes SBA Oversight of Contracts With Alaska Native Firms, 48 GC 
¶ 157, GAO-06-399, Contract Management: Increased Use of Alaska Native 
Corporations’ Special 8(a) Provisions Calls for Tailored Oversight, www.
gao.gov/new.items/d06399.pdf. GAO found, for example, that “SBA has 
not tailored its policies and practices to account for ANCs’ unique status 
in the 8(a) program and their growth in federal contracting, even though 
SBA officials recognize that ANC firms enter into more complex business 
relationships than other 8(a) participants.” While stopping short of accus-
ing SBA of imitating an ostrich with its head in the sand, GAO concluded 
that SBA provided inadequate oversight by not:
•  determining whether more than one subsidiary of the same ANC 
is generating the majority of revenue under the same primary 
industry [Note: “From fiscal year 1988 to 2005, ANC 8(a) subsid-
iaries increased from one subsidiary owned by one ANC to 154 
subsidiaries owned by 49 ANCs.”];
•  consistently determining whether other small businesses are 
losing contracting opportunities when large, sole-source 8(a) con-
tracts are awarded to ANC firms;
•  adhering to a legislative and regulatory requirement to ascer-
tain whether 8(a) ANC firms have, or are likely to obtain, a sub-
stantial unfair competitive advantage within an industry;
•  ensuring that the partnerships between ANC firms and large 
firms are functioning in the way they were intended under the 
8(a) program; and
•  maintaining information on ANCs’ 8(a) activity.
 Of course, domestic preferences and ANC set-asides are but two 
anecdotes in the unruly and oh-so-unattractive feeding frenzy of social 
interests brutally jockeying for their piece of the federal procurement pie. 
See, e.g., Snowe Wants GSA to Set-Aside Large IT Acquisition for HUBZone 
Firms, 48 GC ¶ 388; Federal Government Earns D- On Small Business 
Contracting, 48 GC ¶ 275; Senate Panel and SBA IG Call Small Business 
Contracting Numbers Misleading, 48 GC ¶ 255; SBA Issues Long-Awaited 
Notice On Set-Asides for Women Owned Firms, 48 GC ¶ 222; DOD More 
Likely to Pay Small Business Contractors Late, GAO Finds, 48 GC ¶ 195; 
Inadequate Management Contributes to DOE’s Failure to Meet Small 
Business Goals, GAO Says, 48 GC ¶ 139.
iX. PReSUMeD GooD FAiTH: A MATTeR oF PeRSPeCTiVe. 
The Panel found that contractors do not enjoy a level playing field in their 
relationship with their customer when it comes to good faith. “Although 
the presumption of good faith applies equally to both parties to a commer-
cial contract in the event of a performance dispute with the government, 
contractors do not enjoy the same legal presumptions regarding good faith 
of the parties. Current precedent provides that the government enjoys 
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an enhanced presumption of good faith and regularity in such a dispute.” 
Draft Report at 7. Accordingly, “with a view toward ensuring fairness[, 
t]he Panel recommends legislation to ensure that contractors, as well as 
the government, enjoy the same legal presumptions, regarding good faith 
and regularity, in discharging their duties and in exercising their rights 
in connection the performance of any government procurement contract, 
and either party’s attempt to rebut any such presumption that applies 
to the other party’s conduct shall be subject to a uniform evidentiary 
standard that applies equally to both parties.” Id. We think that makes 
sense. To the extent that we are former Justice Department litigators, we 
remain baffled by the controversy that this recommendation generates. 
See, generally, Presumption of Good Faith Should Apply to Contractors 
As Well As Government, SARA Panel Says, 48 GC ¶ 232; W. Stanfield 
Johnson, Still Needed: Augmentation of Government Ethics Standards To 
Embrace “Square Dealing” With Contractors – And A Possible Resolution, 
20 N&R ¶ 60 (December 2006) (suggesting, inter alia, that a code of eth-
ics based on § 205 of the Restatement be adopted for both parties to the 
Government contract); Linda P. Armstrong, Walter H. Pupko, and Donald 
M. Yenovkian II, Federal Procurement Ethical Requirements and the Good 
Faith Presumption, 20 N&CR ¶ 29 (June 2006) (“The presumption that 
Government officials perform their duties in good faith is well established 
throughout the United States. Current law, as described above, balances 
the need for adequate remedies for contractors that have been damaged 
by inappropriate Government conduct against the need of the Government 
to exercise discretion in the administration of its contracts.”). We find this 
a convenient segue into a trend we’d like to see come to an end.
X. ConTRACTinG in iRAQ. Not surprisingly, the (now Phoenix-
like) Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the 
GAO found plentiful ammunition to criticize the Iraq procurement effort. 
Documents Evidence Prohibited Subcontracts for Security in Iraq, 48 GC 
¶ 438 (Representatives Waxman (D-Calif.) and Van Hollen (D-Md.) fret 
that security services were obtained through a KBR LOGCAP subcontract); 
SIGIR Criticizes KBR Practice of Declaring Information Proprietary, 48 GC 
¶ 389; Army Did Not Adequately Monitor Reconstruction Contract Over-
head, SIGIR Says, 48 GC ¶ 379; Panelists Blame Inadequate Government 
Oversight for Reconstruction Failings, 48 GC ¶ 362 (George Washington 
University Law School Forum); GAO Reports on $3.5 Billion in Unsup-
ported or Questioned Iraq Contract Costs, 48 GC ¶ 343; SIGIR Reports 
Severe Waste-Water Leaks in New Barracks at Baghdad Police College, 48 
GC ¶ 341, SIGIR Reports on Lessons Learned and Status of Iraq Contract-
ing, 48 GC ¶ 273; Democrats Call for Hearings on Iraq Reconstruction 
Contracting, 48 GC ¶ 226; Private Security Provider Costs Unknown; Lack 
of Coordination Remains, 48 GC ¶ 215; Corps of Engineers Reimburses 
KBR’s Controversial Iraq Fuel-Supply Costs, 48 GC ¶ 81; SIGIR Reports 
More CPA Mismanagement, 48 GC ¶ 34. For every contractor misdeed, 
and we concede that there have been many, we continue to find that the 
root cause of most of the Government’s contracting ills in Iraq derived 
(and continue to suffer) from well-known and predictable procurement 
pathologies: unrealistic expectations and demands from political officials; 
insufficient numbers of qualified acquisition personnel and high turnover 
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amongst existing personnel (and the attendant lack of institutional knowl-
edge); lack of advance acquisition planning; poor requirements definition; 
inadequate competition; limited transparency; poorly drafted contractual 
vehicles; and, of course, inadequate post award administration, quality 
assurance, and oversight. See, generally, Griff Witte, The Builder Who 
Bombed in Iraq:Battered Over Failed Projects, Parsons’s CEO Fires Back 
at Government Critics, Wash. Post D01 (December 22, 2006):
 [Parsons Corp. CEO James F.] McNulty said the government 
handed Parsons an impossible task by setting unrealistically 
high expectations for how much could be built while under-
funding its efforts…. [T]he company repeatedly pleaded with the 
government to either provide enough money to get the job done 
or scale back its goals, but said its entreaties were ignored.
On a related note, see Ralph C. Nash, Relying on the Government: Seller 
Beware!, 20 N&CR ¶ 50 (October 2006) (“We have repeatedly warned 
contractors that they should not rely on actions of the Government but 
should know the rules of Government contracting.... Government con-
tractors have to be experts on the statutes and regulations that govern 
the procurement process and cannot rely on Government officials. If the 
Government folks make a mistake, it is the unknowing contractor that 
pays the price.”)
On a positive note, the Government has taken great strides to address 
the rapidly evolving role of (and the Government’s reliance upon) contrac-
tors on the battlefield, particularly arms-bearing contractors. Richard L. 
Dunn, Interim Rule On Contractor Personnel Accompanying U.S. Armed 
Forces, 48 GC ¶ 221; DOD Issues Interim Rule For Contractors Authorized 
to Accompany U.S. Troops, 48 GC ¶ 217. On a less cheery note, we fear 
that the Abu Ghraib debacle may have been a harbinger for Guantanamo 
Bay. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: 
Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 
16 stanforD LaW & PoLICY revIeW 549 (2005) (was this the straw that 
broke the camel’s back on unregulated interagency contracting?); Griff 
Witte and Renae Merle, Contractors Are Cited in Abuses at Guantanamo: 
Reports Indicate Interrogation Role, Wash. Post D01 (January 4, 2007) 
(documents released through an ACLU lawsuit “suggest a greater role 
for contractors than was previously known”).
1  The Federal Procurement Report for 2005 charts, “Federal Contract Actions 
and Dollars by Executive Department and Agency,” report the number of actions 
for FY2005 as 5.94 million.
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